

support this public behaviour. One may argue that they usually do, that one's criticism can be honed on novels or history and only secondarily turn out to be vital for recent political debates. Nevertheless, if public appearance is limited or eliminated altogether, no amount of honing critical skills will do. As a matter of fact, this point has only very recently been noticed. Sennett bemoans the loss of public engagement in his studies on the fall of the public man; the academic security prohibiting public commitment is the main theme of Russel Jacoby's polemical essay 'The Last Intellectuals' (the subtitle draws our attention to the fact that it is a study of 'American culture in the age of academe').

Levy is very clear about the tentative, provisional nature of recognition granted to intellectuals participating in public debates by society at large. 'Authority? Discussion. Legitimacy? Discussion' (p. 96). Most organization theorists would probably be puzzled; if intellectuals are neither managers of the public sphere nor professionals accepted because of their status built up elsewhere, in a narrower sphere of competence, how can they ever expect recognition according to the organization theories?

At this point, one is tempted to side with Levy rather than with his potential critics. Participation in a rational and general discussion is a redeeming civic virtue of professionals. Otherwise, they are condemned to their restraining iron cages of respective specialities and their organized institutions. However, we should keep in mind that there are two sides to this coin of liberty to engage in public discussions and conflicts. First, there is a democratic side: one does not remain an expert, one is willing to act as a responsible citizen. Second, there is a disturbing ambiguity about the spill-over effect of one's status as an expert (valid for a limited domain) which is supposedly aiding one's actions *outside* the domain in which expertise has been established. In other words: when Chomsky speaks up about Nicaragua, he is listened to not only because he is perceived as a concerned citizen, but also because he has already established his reputation in linguistics. Now, can this reputation, which does not have anything to do with validity of his pronouncements in a citizens' debate, be considered an unfair edge in the competition for the right to voice one's opinions in the public sphere?

One is somewhat less comfortable with the author's list of criteria which have to be met if this participation in public debates is to be a valid chance for intellectuals. First, Levy mentions a belief in rational solutions. Well, this is a valid criterion, but somewhat tautological (a definition of an intellectual presupposes at least tacit or hypocritical belief in rational operations). Second, Levy evokes the idea that the very idea of rational truth has to be recognized. Now, this is certainly true, but one should complete this criterion with another *proviso*. Namely, this idea of truth should remain ethical and formal, i.e. it should not require a commitment to any single ontology, especially a social ontology. Third, the idea of justice. This one is correct: the idea of justice, fairness, reciprocity has to be present in order to make interventions in public debates matter.

An idea of justice as reciprocity cannot be evoked without self-criticism on a