

heureux avec moi-même, atteste de ma métamorphose et m'aide presque à renaître, lavé de ce passé, ailleurs, ailleurs...» (297-98)

Such insouciance is one of the dangers of refusing the self-identical subject. If that subject had been open to one form of bad faith, 'seriousness', this indeterminate subject, never present to itself, can fall just as quickly into another form, *légèreté*.

Lévy's indictment of Sartre II - famous for saying that 'an anti-Communist is a dog' - is very strong, although not strong enough to outweigh the merits he finds in the incorrigible anti-fascist, anti-anti-Semite, and anti-determinist who was Sartre I. Like Lilla and Wolin, he appears committed to some form of liberal democracy. However, there may be a problem with this, one to which I have alluded earlier. None of the three authors seems inclined to make a distinction between the intellectual's right to follow a train of thought where it may lead him and the intellectual's advocacy - including direct political advocacy - of tyrannical regimes. This is why it is so important to Wolin to insist that there is a kind of fascist aura to Heidegger's *work*. His repeated warnings against the dangers of 'existentialism' arise from this view that the texts themselves incline towards Nazism: 'By proceeding from a philosophical standpoint that consistently valued the particular over the universal, Heidegger's thought was exposed from the outset to grave ethical and political deficits. This conclusion suggests that in seeking to account for Heidegger's 1933 political lapsus, the existential standpoint he cultivated in the early 1920s is as important as the historical-biographical contingencies stressed by his defenders' (*Heidegger's Children*, 177). Again: it is easier to say this after the 'contingent' Heidegger made his fateful decision. One would have to assume that readers who were never tempted to support Hitler but who admired the range, boldness, and complexity of *Being and Time* should have suffered similar 'ethical and political deficits.' Instead, many political conclusions were drawn, across the political spectrum, and one would like to hear in some detail precisely how these readers of Heidegger either *erred* or were spared by virtue, perhaps, of 'historical-biographical contingencies' of their own.

As for the author of *Being and Nothingness* (1943), one might have as easily predicted a 'free-market' liberalism (or socialism, or anarchism) in his future as a descent into what Lionel Abel once called the 'metaphysical Stalinism' of *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (1960). Indeed, it is because of the possibility of that former course that the French Party's ideologues spent so much time attacking Sartre in the immediate post-war period.

Lévy does not write at very great length about the *Critique*, perhaps because such a behemoth would have swallowed all the space available to him. What *can* one say about it? Perhaps, first, that Sartre should have

realized that classic Marxism and classic existentialism could not enter into peaceful dialectical coexistence with each other. The first place to look for evidence of that dilemma is the prose. Sartre wrote it on corydane, an amphetamine, and one might say he needed all the help he could get. Compared to the prose of *Being and Nothingness* (difficult but often beautiful and dramatically powerful), the prose of the later book is clotted and unforgetting, only occasionally rising to moments of great power and insight. Unfortunately, these are often places that generate the charge of metaphysical Stalinism, as in the account of the crowd of 'serial selves,' waiting for the bus, or in the account of these selves, seared by the fires of history, as they become a 'fused group' (as in the storming of the Bastille), or in the account of the birth of a terror, when the fused group, sensing its fusion is loosening, swears an oath of violence, or, in a pure Sartrean gloom that Lévy should have noted, when the once-annealed members of the fused and 'sworn' group undergo organization, institutionalization, and bureaucracy and find themselves again heading back towards 'seriality' (Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason*, 345-664).

That Marxism was a failure as a theory of government, and that this failure may inhere in the Sacred Texts of the movement, does not deny that there is 'alienation,' exploitation, seriality, etc. Where philotyranny occurs is in the failure of the intellectual to distinguish between regimes and the socio-historical illnesses that a particular method may permit one to recognize. It is a point one might just as easily make of the *völkisch* elements that lead the conservative Heidegger into certain powerful insights - and then, in a moment of failed judgment, into a failure to see what is entailed by the actual political situation of 1933.

What one is left with from these books is the sense that the intellectual is someone who may be led into political commitment out of a need to influence some form of historical 'crisis,' whether it be Weimar, the Depression, the Cold War, or whatever historical urgencies beset the liberal democratic states of the contemporary world. It is as if, at such times, a Heidegger or a Sartre believes his ideas demand his involvement in the world of historical action, as if mere 'words' and analysis are insufficient and a sign of 'inauthenticity.' And it is as if such thinkers lose their power to make political discriminations, so convinced are they that whatever evil in liberal democracy concerns them is an *irremediable* evil, requiring change from the root.

In 1938, Sartre I wrote *The Psychology of Imagination*. For him the imagination is an ambiguous faculty. One might say with Lévy that Sartre II came to distrust imagination after having made powerful use of it himself at all levels of his work. However, even in 1938 one senses a certain contempt for the faculty and for the fundamentally 'impoverished' nature of the 'image.' Absolutely essential to Sartrean notions of freedom (because it is able to leap beyond the given), the imagination nevertheless